Patents: Hiding from History by McJohn, Stephen M.
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 24 | Issue 4 Article 7
2008
Patents: Hiding from History
Stephen M. McJohn
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Stephen M. McJohn, Patents: Hiding from History, 24 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 961 (2012).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol24/iss4/7
ARTICLES
PATENTS: HIDING FROM HISTORY
Stephen M. McJohnt
Abstract
This essay analyzes how various patent rules, viewed together,
indirectly cause a distorted historical record of technological
development. Part II of this essay looks at a recent book, The
Democratization of Invention, that relied heavily on patent records to
reexamine acutely the historical role of intellectual property in
economic development. Part II of this essay discusses how patent law
today discourages an inventor from accurately disclosing her
invention and its place in technological development. Instead, patent
law indirectly encourages vague and overbroad descriptions of the
invention. Case law on claim interpretation uses specific disclosures
about the invention to limit the scope of the patent claims. This leads
to patent drafters using what has been called "intentional obscurity."
Similarly, the law governing disclosure encourages inventors not to
define their terms, or identify the category of invention in the
preamble, or limit the claims to the actual invention. Likewise,
inventors are at a disadvantage if they explain the advantages of the
claimed invention or submit software code used to implement the
invention. Even keeping informed on technology in the field may hurt
the inventor. Reform of such rules could help the patent system today,
and, as a byproduct, tomorrow's history. Reforms that improve the
quality of patent applications for their primary purposes (such as
examination, licensing, and litigation) would likewise improve their
value for the future.
t Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. Thanks to Lorie Graham.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent records can be a rich resource for researchers of all
stripes. Economists have long used patent records in studying the
relationship between technology and economic development. As The
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain put it, "[o]ne of the
few available quantitative output indicators for technology" is the
records of the United States Patent & Trademark Office ("Patent
Office").' Patents also provide a source of information for the history
of technology itself, as well as a useful source of technical
information. Thomas P. Jones, an influential figure in early United
States patent practice, "envisioned the Patent Office as a great
repository of technical wisdom. He saw it, on one hand, as a museum
in which the mechanic could trace the historical progress of the art
and, on the other hand, as a collection which described the present
state of the art.",2 Patent records have been used to rethink the role of
marginalized groups, as in Mothers and Daughters of Invention:
Notes for a Revised History of Technology3 and A Hammer in Their
Hands: A Documentary History of Technology and the African-
American Experiences.4  Patent records have facilitated more
specialized histories such as Cotton. Origin, History, Technology and
Production5 and Glass: The Miracle Maker: Its History, Technology
and Applications.6 Often, the only remaining documentary evidence
of an invention is its patent record.7 Patents have also played a role in
1. Kristine Bruland, Industrialisation and Technological Change, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN 122 (Roderick Floud & Paul Johnson eds., 2004).
History resonates in intellectual property law, with its structure of origin stories invoking
mythical moments of creation and discovery. See generally Jessica Silbey, The Mythical
Beginnings ofIntellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319 (2008).
2. Bruce Sinclair, Thomas P. Jones and the Evolution of Technical Education, in
TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF INDIVIDUALS AND IDEAS 66 (Carroll W. Pursell, Jr.
ed., 2d ed. 1990).
3. AUTUMN STANLEY, MOTHERS AND DAUGHTERS OF INVENTION: NOTES FOR A
REVISED HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY (Rutgers Univ. Press 1995) (1993).
4. A HAMMER IN THEIR HANDS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE
AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (Carroll Pursell ed., 2005) (discussing numerous inventions
patented by African American inventors).
5. O.L. May & K.E. Lege, Development of the World Cotton Industry, in COTTON:
ORIGIN, HISTORY, TECHNOLOGY, AND PRODUCTION 78 (C. Wayne Smith & J. Tom Cothren
eds., 1999) (discussing market competition sparked by a patented cotton gin which "used spikes
attached to a cylinder rather than the saws in modem gins.").
6. C. J. PHILLIPS. GLASS: THE MIRACLE MAKER: ITS HISTORY, TECHNOLOGY AND
APPLICATIONS 195, 209-10 (1941).
7. See, e.g., ROBERT S. WOODBURY. HISTORY OF THE GEAR-CUTTING MACHINE: A
HISTORICAL STUDY IN GEOMETRY AND MACHINES 106 (1958) ("Another hobbing machine of
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forensic research. Art conservation scientists used patents on paints
and pigments to conclude that certain paintings attributed to Jackson
Pollock were actually painted after his death. 8 Patents even play a role
in biographical research. The patents of Abraham Lincoln 9 and Albert
Einstein'l show less known sides of their personalities."
However, the utility of the records is limited to the information
disclosed. Part II of this essay looks at a recent book that relied
heavily on patent records and copyright registrations to reexamine
acutely the role of intellectual property in economic development.
12
Part III discusses how patent law today discourages an inventor from
accurately disclosing her invention and its place in technological
development. Several aspects of patent law encourage applicants to
describe and claim not what they have invented, but rather a vague
and overbroad version of their invention. Rather than encouraging
accurate disclosure, patent law encourages what has been called
"intentional obscurity."' 13 The essay then considers how proposals for
patent reform would likely affect the value of patents for future
researchers, concluding that reforms that improve the quality of patent
applications for their primary purposes (such as examination,
licensing, and litigation) would likewise improve their value for the
future.
which we have only the patent was that of Henry Belfield .... See his Patent No. 120,023 of
Oct. 17, 1871 ."). See also Jo Carrillo, Protecting A Piece Of American Folklore: The Example
Of The Gusset, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 203, 232-33 n.138 (1997):
As there is no patent number or mark on the single remaining 'Ladies' Hiking
Tog' garment that survives in the Levi Strauss & Co. Archives, the garment itself
confirms Levi historian McDonough's statement that it was not constructed
under a patent. But note that this type of gusset, which is distinct from the public
domain gusset, was eventually patented. See U.S. Patent No. 4,392,259... ; U.S.
Patent No. 3,745,589, 'Triangular Crotches for Trousers,' issued to Ebbe Bruno
Borsing, (Jul. 17, 1973); U.S. Patent No. 478,190
(citation omitted).
8. Randy Kennedy, A Pollock, in the Eyes ofArt and Science, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007,
at A18.
9. Bouying Vessels Over Shoals, U.S. Patent No. 6,469 (filed Mar. 10, 1849) (issued
May 22, 1849).
10. Refrigeration, U.S. Patent No. 1,781,541 (filed Dec. 16, 1927) (issued Nov. 11,
1930).
11. Lincoln's patent was for a boat while Einstein's patent was for a refrigerator. These
patents are quite different from what they were famous for (politics and theoretical science).
12. B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920 (2005) [hereinafter
DEMOCRATIZATION].
13. Phillips v. AWH Takes A Casualty: "Interface" Construed As "Parallel Bus
Interface" www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/05/philips-v-awh-t.html (May 11, 2006)
[hereinafter Phillips].
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11. PATENT RECORDS As A PRIMARY HISTORICAL SOURCE
Intellectual property has standard stories: the United States has
gone from the greatest pirate to the greatest policeman of intellectual
property rights; European intellectual property differs from its
American cousin because it rests on a philosophical, not economic,
grounding; great inventors differ from mere patent-seeking marketers;
and intellectual property faces unprecedented challenges in the light
of twenty-first century technologies. Democratization debunks those
stories, using detailed empirical research to more fully explain the
role intellectual property law and institutions played in the economic
development of the United States in the nineteenth century.
Democratization draws on several categories of historical sources in
addressing a number of historical issues, but relies primarily on the
records of the Patent Office. Those records contain not just the
description of each invention and the claims, but also inventors'
occupations, gender, race, and geographical category; citations to
other patents; assignments of patent ownership; and other
information.
A familiar tale in intellectual property is the conversion of the
United States from nineteenth century pirate to twentieth century
policeman. No law school intellectual property course or debate about
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Agreement seems complete with mentioning that the United States
has only gradually and conveniently come to the side of intellectual
property, after freely taking the fruits of other countries' creators for
much of its history. The complaints of Charles Dickens echo more
than a century later.' 4 Democratization shows that the United States
was, if anything, even more calculating addressing whether to give
rights to foreigners.' 5 In copyright, the tale is true. Only inch by inch,
finally ending in 1989, did the United States come to join the
international copyright regime.16 In contrast, the opposite is true with
respect to patents. The United States was an early adherent to
international patent standards and to recognizing the rights of foreign
inventors.
Democratization uses patent records and other historical sources
to show how the different treatment of copyright and patents made
eminent sense for the United States during the "long Nineteenth
14. See DEMOCRATIZATION, supra note 12, at 274 (noting that Dickens "publicly and in
his writings launched bitter diatribes against 'the continental brigands' in the United States.").
15. Id. at 258-61.
16. ld. at 303.
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Century." As a new nation with a relatively undeveloped literary
heritage, the United States had much to gain by disregarding
international copyright.17 There was a large body of English language
works ready to be harvested. U.S. publishers were unconstrained by
licensing fees, which could benefit U.S. consumers (even if American
authors were doubly disadvantaged by competing against free imports
and by lack of protection abroad).
However, in the field of patent law, the United States was more
ready to compete. Americans were early contributors to technological
innovation, and patent law reflected that. Domestically, the United
States was quick to implement a thorough patent law and an effective
office to administer the law.' 8 Internationally, the United States
quickly joined international agreements and gave patent protection to
foreign inventors. 19 The patent records reflect the widespread impulse
in the United States to invent - and to seek commercial advantage
from patenting inventions. The number of patents per capita was
greater in the United States than in Britain.z° Influential figures often
credited the patent system for the widespread technological advances
in the United States, along with its economic benefits.2'
U.S. patent law did differ from the systems in Europe. The
differences both reflected and reinforced the democratic nature of the
United States in several senses of the word. In Europe, patent law
reflected a more elitist basis.22 Patents were not given so freely, but
rather reserved for special inventions. Patent fees were high, making
it impracticable for the average inventor to secure intellectual
property rights.23 The national patent offices were strongly influenced
by aristocratic privilege, meaning that social connections were often
more important in securing rights than individual inventive
contributions. One French applicant included the apparently relevant
information that his wife was a wealthy heiress and gave five first
names, along with the name of her noble family.2 4 His application was
granted. Drawing on records from the respective patent systems,
Democratization shows that patentees in Europe were more likely to
17. See id. at 222-25.
18. Id. at 53.
19. Id. at 57-59.
20. Id. at 62.
21. Id. at 54 (quoting a contemporary observer: "The cheap patent law of the United
States has been and still is the secret of the great success of that country.").
22. Id. at 63.
23. Id. at 47, 63-64.
24. Id. at 44n.55.
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be from the elite classes than in the United States.25 They were also
more likely than in the United States to be from the major cities, as
opposed the poorer rural regions.26
Patent law operated quite differently in the young United States.
The Patent Office was in some senses one of the most democratic
institutions in the country. Rather than a place of patronage, the
Patent Office was subject to typical American checks and balances.27
This resulted in greater confidence in the Patent Office, with a marked
difference in controls on patents. In some European countries, there
was no system of patent examination for fear that examiners would
extract favors in exchange for favorable rulings. 28 However, because
the Patent Office was relatively politically independent and
trustworthy (relatively!), patent applications were examined before
patents issued.29
Other limitations were also absent in the United States. Patent
fees were kept far lower than other countries, allowing far greater
social access to patent rights.30 The inventor was even spared the cost
of mailing the application under the U.S. Post Office policy that gave
free postage to patent applications. 31 The standard for patent
protection was also lower. Rather than reserving patents for
exceptional inventions, patents were granted for even modest
contributions to homely technologies.
The Patent Office was also relatively more open than other
governmental institutions. Inventors were not barred by race or
gender from applying for patents. Free blacks secured patents as early
as 1821, although slaves were still denied the ability to patent their
inventions. 32 Women regularly received patents, although family and
property law often denied them the ability to fully exploit their
inventions commercially. 33 Low patent fees and a straightforward
examination process meant that lack of wealth, education, or
connections would not act as a bar to patent protection.
25. DEMOCRATIZATION, supra note 12, at 63.
26. Id. at 59-60.
27. Id. at 52.
28. Id. (noting that France opposed examination for fear that officeholders would abuse
their power).
29. Id. at 51-53.
30. See id. at 54-55.
31. Id. at 59.
32. Id. at 124-25.
33. Id. at 128-81.
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Democratization then goes beyond describing the differences in
social and legal factors in the U.S. patent system to detailed empirical
investigation of the social effects of those differences. The more open
U.S. system did affect the actual access by inventors. The number of
patents issued per capita in the United States was much higher than in
other countries. 34 Democratization then traces a number of specific
economic repercussions. The occupations of patentees, as disclosed in
applications, reflected shifts in economic activity. For several decades
beginning in 1790, most patentees, such as merchants, were involved
in bringing goods into the country. 35 As economic development
opened up more spheres of domestic manufacturing (as opposed to
relying on imports from more developed countries), so too did the
range of patentee's occupations broaden to include artisans,
engineers, and manufacturers. 36 By 1860, merchants had gone from
the majority of patentees to less than 3.3%.37
Democratization also mines the patent records to explore
whether inventors tended to specialize in particular sectors of
industry. One might expect increasing specialization over time, as
technology became more sophisticated, making it more difficult for
inventors to work broadly or in multiple fields. However,
Democratization found (after controlling for such variables as region,
access to transportation, and urbanization) no trend toward
specialization.38 Very likely, market incentives for inventors to work
broadly counterbalanced technological barriers.
39
Democratization uses the patent records to explore the
characteristics of prolific inventors. "Great inventors," it transpires,
sought patents in patterns quite similar to ordinary inventors. 40 The
popular culture figure of the great inventor, struggling to push
technology forward and detached from others' concerns about
commerce, does not withstand statistical analysis of patent records.41
Prolific inventors sought patents in profitable areas of commerce,
changed areas of technology along with changes in the overall
economy, moved their workplaces to locations with low
transportation costs and ready markets, and filed applications in
34. See DEMOCRATIZATION, supra note 12, at 35, 62.
35. Id. at 114.
36. Id. at 115.
37. Id. at 116 n.16.
38. Id. at 118.
39. Id. at 120.
40. Id. at 187-88.
41. Id. at 188.
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patterns that rose and fell with economic cycles of expansion and
recession. 42 The characteristics of prolific inventors, however,
changed over time. During the nineteenth century, they tended to lack
formal education, and concentrated in areas that rewarded "trial and
error experimentation. ' ' 3  However, as the twentieth century
introduced increasing complexity in technology and commerce,
prolific inventors tended to have formal training in science or
engineering.44
The historical perspective of Democratization shows that many
of today's patent controversies are old wine in new bottles. Much is
said of how today's rapidly changing technologies offer special
challenges to intellectual property law. But many "new"
developments are new versions of old stories. There is concern that
the increase of patenting along with the spread of patent subject
matter will lead to patent thickets, areas of technology such as
software where innovation is hemmed by patents. However, patents
have often been somewhat concentrated. Swiss inventors seeking U.S.
patents in the nineteenth century, for example, were strongly skewed
toward the areas of music boxes and watches.45 Others have shown
early concerns about patent thickets in such areas as sugar
manufacturing.46
Today's patent problems have naturally led to proposals that the
standards for patents should be raised. The KSR case recently decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court concerned the proper standard for holding
that an invention is nonobvious and therefore patentable.47 Some,
including the U.S. Solicitor General, have argued that exclusive rights
could be limited to only exceptional innovations. 8 Democratization
42. DEMOCRATIZATION, supra note 12, at 188.
43. Id. at 187-88.
44. Id. at 220.
45. Id. at 292.
46. See Bronwyn H. Hall, Issues in and Possible Reforms of the U. S. Patent System 3
n.4 (Jan. 4, 2006) http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/papers/BHH06_JapanSymposium.pdf:
In the manufacture with which I am connected - the sugar trade - there are
somewhere like 300 or 400 patents. Now, how are we to know all these 400
patents? How are we to manage continually, in the natural process of making
improvements in manufacture, to know which of these patents we are at any time
conflicting with?
(noting a statement from a sugar manufacturer prior to 1865).
47. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
48. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, KSR Int'l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (stating that patents should issue
only for an "extraordinary level of invention.").
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exhaustively shows, however, one considerable advantage to the early
U.S. economy was that incremental inventions could be patented,
meaning there was considerable incentive for modest invention, and
resources were directed that way. This suggests that the problem
today may not be that too many modest inventions are patentable, but
rather that patents are issuing where there is insufficient disclosure to
show whether the applicant has truly invented anything.
Recent years have seen a number of movements actively
disavowing intellectual property rights. In the free software
movement, also known as "open source software," developers give up
most of their rights in their code (patent, copyright, trademark, and
trade secret) in software they have developed.49 Other authors use
licenses like the Creative Commons License to effectively put their
writings in the public domain. 50 Democratization reminds us that the
constraints of intellectual property law have similarly rankled the very
authors and inventors who could use it. Patent dissenters in the 1800s
deliberately left their inventions unpatented, in the public interest. 5'
Patent abolitionists in a number of countries sought the repeal of
patent laws, even succeeding in Holland for a number of years.
52
Democratization shows the great value of patent records as
research sources, relying on them for several types of historical work:
social, political, technological, and economic. The book fits into a
long line of works using patents as primary research sources. This
section turns to the value of today's patents for future researchers.
III. TODAY'S PATENTS AS TOMORROW'S HISTORY
A future historian working with today's patents would have
much material to work with. Less than one million patents were
issued during the nineteenth century. 53 Almost one million patents
were issued just in the years 2000 through 2005. 54 The range of
patentable subject matter has increased dramatically in recent decades
49. See generally Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes Of Free Software, 9 GEO. MASON
L. REv. 25 (2000).
50. See Creative Commons, License Your Work,
http://creativecommons.org/about/license/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
51. DEMOCRATIZATION, supra note 12, at 205.
52. Id. at 289-90.
53. See Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office, United States Patent &
Trademark Office Issues 7 Millionth Patent (Feb. 14, 2006),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/06-09.htm.
54. Id.
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to include such areas as software,55 biotechnology,56 and business
methods. 57 So patents would seem to provide a trove of information
for researchers in many areas.
The information in those patents, however, is likely to be much
less helpful than a researcher would hope. A common justification for
patent rights is the implicit bargain: an inventor discloses her
invention in exchange for a grant of exclusive rights.58 So rather than
using the invention as a trade secret, an inventor makes it public in
exchange for legal protection against copiers. 59 She has to make
several types of disclosure: the written description must describe the
invention as well as the best mode of making and using the
invention.60 The claims must claim what is new about her invention,
entitling her to a patent.6 She must also disclose any relevant prior
art that she is aware of, meaning she must inform the Patent Office of
things like other patents, technology, and publications which would
be relevant in deciding if her claimed invention is indeed new and
nonobvious.62
That scheme sounds good not just for the Patent Office and
courts and others interested in the technology, but for future
historians. Someone in 2060 writing about the early years of internet
commerce would have many patents to read, on such inventions as
online business methods and efficient means of handing network
traffic.6 3 The researcher might expect the patents to fully disclose
what the claimed invention was, what its important features were,
55. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981) (holding that a claim
containing a mathmatical formula is patentable when it implements the formula to transform an
article to a different state or thing).
56. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980) (holding that a
human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter).
57. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming that business methods are patentable).
58. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-151
(1989) ("The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging
the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design in
return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years.").
59. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade
Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 371,
377 (2002).
60. 35 U.S.C. 112 (2000).
61. Id.
62. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2007).
63. In the age of email, electronic archives, and digital memory generally, present
inventors are likely to leave many more traces than those of the nineteenth century. But patent
records will remain important, because other records are likely to be less organized and publicly
accessible than patent databases.
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what various ways it could be embodied in different technologies,
what other devices had come before, and how the advantages and
disadvantages of the patented invention compared to other existing
technology. However, patent law, in its present state, discourages
applicants from fully disclosing those matters.
Rather, experts in claim drafting offer the following advice to
inventors and patent drafters: 64 Do not define the terms used in your
claims; do not identify the category of invention in the preamble to
the claims; do not identify features of the invention as "important;"
and do not even use the word "invention" in the written description.
Such claim drafting has been described as a trend toward "intentional
obscurity. 65  The case law similarly encourages limiting the
disclosure in the written description.66 Do not explain the flaws of
competing technology, or the advantages of the claimed invention. If
the invention is software-related, do not submit a copy of the program
code. Do not do a prior art search to see if others have invented
similar technology, because you will then have to submit any relevant
prior art along with your patent application. Do not even keep up on
technology in the field because if you find out that others have
developed relevant technology, you will likewise have to let the
Patent Office know. As to describing the "background of the
invention," one patent litigator regards it an "admission against
interest. ',6
7
In short, while an inventor might want to set down her role in the
development of technology as fully as possible in her patent
application, her patent practitioner may advise her to do exactly the
opposite: disclose only what is necessary to get your patent because
more disclosure gives courts more grounds to read your claims
narrowly. As to knowledge of the field generally, avoid learning
about relevant prior art, because then you do not have to disclose it. If
real property had such rules, then a party filing a deed, rather than
giving the location of the property in metes and bounds, would simply
disclose that she claims some real estate, of unspecified dimensions,
somewhere in the vicinity.
64. The legal rules prompting such advice are discussed infra pp. 972-76.
65. See Phillips, supra note 13.
66. See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
67. Jeffrey L. Snow, Claim Drafting Issues from the Litigator's Point of View, Tactics for
Mastering Markman Issues (October 20, 2006) (unpublished presentation, on file with author).
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To take one example, Albert Einstein's 1930 patent on a
refrigerator would likely have been drafted much less lucidly today.
68
Einstein's patent, reflecting his practical and commercial interest in
refrigeration, has been explored by numerous writers. This side of
him contrasts with his popular image as an abstract, non-worldly
genius. The patent is a clear exposition of the invention of Einstein
and Leo Szilard. It is so clear that it violates several of today's
obfuscatory patent drafting tips in the first two paragraphs. Its first
words are "Our invention," a phrase to be avoided. 69 The second
paragraph explores "the objects and advantages of our invention,"
aspects which a canny drafter today would avoid, because they could
be used to limit the scope of the claims to a refrigerator with precisely
those attributes. 70 The patent then goes on to discuss "a preferred
embodiment of our invention," a phrase to be avoided for the same
reason (risking limiting the scope of the claims to that particular
embodiment). 7 1 The claims begin with the preamble "refrigerating
apparatus," where claim drafting practice often advises keeping the
preamble very broad because it means that the claim will not be read
to encompass other possible uses of the technology developed in the
future. 2 Overall, the written description and claims convey precisely
what the inventors have developed and how it fits into the relevant
field of technology. Such a document has proved useful to many
Einstein biographers (and even writers on refrigeration). One doubts
if the sort of vague, generalized, overbroad application encouraged by
today's patent law would have told any more than that Einstein had
done something or other in the area of refrigeration.
Patent law's strange discouragement of disclosure flows partly
from the relationship between the written description and the claims.
The claims define the scope of patent rights. Claims must use words
to describe inventions. Lawyers, of course, fight over interpreting
words in every area of the law: interpretation of statutes; judicial
decisions; contracts; and regulations. Claim interpretation is a key
step in patent litigation. The court interprets the claims to see if they
are broad enough to cover the alleged infringer's technology. Courts
must decide such matters as how broadly does "about" mean in a
68. U.S. Patent No. 1,781,541 (filed Dec. 16, 1927) (issued Nov. 11, 1930).
69. Id. at col. 1 1.1.
70. Id. at col. 1 1.9.
71. Id. atcol.1 1.14.
72. Id. at col. 3 1.49.
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claim, 73 what a "download component" is, 74 and even what the
meaning of "means" is.
75
In interpreting the words of the claim, the first place courts look
is at the patent itself.76 The written description is often used to
interpret the claims. Many decisions have given a narrow reading to
apparently broad claims, based on the written description portion of
the application. If the written description defines a term used in the
claims, the patentee's right will be limited to that definition, even if it
is narrower than the customary meaning of the word.77 Where the
written description refers to "the invention," the claims may be
interpreted to cover only that specific device.78 For example, where
the "background of the invention" section disparaged the use of a
serial interface, a patent claim for a personal digital assistant was read
to cover only a direct parallel bus.7 9 The court also considered the fact
that the applicant had described the use of a direct parallel bus as "a
very important feature" of the device. 80 Furthermore, even if a
claimed invention has broad use, but the specification focuses on
particular applications, the claims may be read narrowly.
81
73. See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a claim term of"a weight ratio of about 1:5" encompassed only "a
range of ratios no greater than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1").
74. Network Commerce, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 422 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(deciding whether "metafiles or Windows Media Player standing alone constitutes a 'download
component').
75. See, e.g., Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (interpreting whether use of "means" in claim triggered means-plus-function rule).
76. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
77. See, e.g., Boss Control, Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., 410 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("Because the specification makes clear that the invention involves a two-stage interrupt mode,
the intrinsic evidence binds Boss to a narrower definition of 'interrupt' than the extrinsic
evidence might support.").
78. See Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
CAFC: Use of Phrase "This Invention" Limits Claim Scope,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/06/cafc use of phr.html (June 25, 2006).
79. Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2006). See also AstraZeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("Where the general summary or description of the invention describes a feature of the invention
(here, micelles formed by the solubilizer) and criticizes other products (here, other solubilizers,
including co-solvents) that lack that same feature, this operates as a clear disavowal of these
other products.").
80. Inpro ll Licensing, S.A.R.L., 450 F.3d at 1354.
81. See, e.g., On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) ("Although we agree with the district court that the Ross invention does not concern
itself with whether the 'customer' reads the book or obtains it for resale, the focus of the Ross
patent is immediate single-copy printing and binding initiated by the customer and conducted at
the customer's site.").
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Patent drafters have reacted to such claim interpretation cases
with obfuscation, by avoiding the disclosures that triggered narrow
readings. As one commentator has ruefully stated, "patent drafters
would do well to ensure that nothing in the patent document is
'important,' 'essential,' 'required,' or the like. Those terms do help
the patent readers better understand your preferred embodiment, but
in court they will only limit your claim scope. 82
Patent applications must disclose relevant prior art to the Patent
Office. However, an applicant need only disclose prior art of which
she is aware. 83 Thus, an applicant need not actively seek relevant
material; rather she need only disclose material she knows of.84 This
creates the perverse incentive to actively avoid learning of other work
in the field, both for inventors and their patent attorneys. Indeed,
some applicants fear that if they search prior art, they face the
dilemma of a determination that they failed to disclose prior art or that
they disclosed too much prior art, "hiding material prior art amidst
'junk' prior art."85 Patent applications often do show surprisingly little
disclosure of relevant technology.
86
The claims also serve disclosure, in a sense. The inventor must
claim the new8 7 and nonobvious aspect8 8 of her invention, and her
patent rights are limited to what she claims.89 This may lead one to
think that, at least with respect to claims, there is a strong incentive to
set the record straight about the place of the invention in the
development of technology. However, as to claims, there is again an
incentive against accurate disclosure. Here, the incentive is to claim
too much (as opposed to disclosing the bare minimum). An inventor
may file multiple claims in her application. Some claims may be
rejected but as long as some claims are allowed, the patent will issue.
82. See Phillips, supra note 13.
83. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2007) (known as Rule 56).
84. Thomas Schneck, The Duty to Search, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 689,
689 (2005).
85. Id. at 695.
86. See generally Internet Patent News Archive - Titles from 2000 to 1994,
http://www.bustpatents.com/archive.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) (listing archives of a patent
news letter that frequently gives examples of issued patents that fail to cite well known work in
the relevant area, especially when the work was not patented ("nonpatent prior art"), and which
offers offers cogent criticism of the patent law system).
87. See 35 U.S.C. 102 (2000).
88. See 35 U.S.C. 103 (2000).
89. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("It is a
'bedrock principle' of patent law that 'the claims of a patent define the invention to which the
patentee is entitled the right to exclude."' (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water
Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d I 111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004))).
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If the inventor, now patentee, sues someone for patent infringement,
the defendant will likely contend that the patent is invalid. The court
may find some of the claims invalid, and some valid. As long as one
of the claims is valid and infringed, the patentee wins. Nowhere along
the way is there a penalty for filing too many claims, or for filing
claims that are broader than the actual invention. The only risk is that
a particular claim may be rejected or held invalid. That does not affect
the validity of other claims. Therefore, the incentive is not for the
patentee to draft claims that best match up to what she has actually
invented; her best strategy is to draft lots of claims, ranging from
narrow to broad. The burden is on the Patent Office, or subsequent
infringers, or anyone else who thinks the patent is too broad, to
invalidate the claims - one at a time.
As a record of technological history, the claims are quite suspect.
If an inventor makes a modest invention, her patent application may
well claim that modest invention - but also claim much broader
versions of it that she could not actually make. If the patent makes it
through the Patent Office and no one spends millions of dollars in
litigation to have the broad claims in the patent invalidated, then the
patent record would considerably overstate her contribution to
technological progress.
The applicant must also provide disclosure that would enable
others to make and use the invention.9" However, courts have applied
the enablement requirement leniently with respect to newer subject
matter areas such as software and business methods.9 1 For example,
an applicant for a software patent need not disclose the code that she
uses. The level of disclosure is low, even in "good" software
patents.9 2 The lower disclosure requirement for such patents means
not just that the patent is easier to get, but that it is more difficult to
figure out what (if anything) the applicant has really invented.
The rules governing prior art discourage disclosure and even
acquiring knowledge. Democratization was not a history of
technology, but rather was a history of the interplay between
90. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
91. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) ("The Federal Circuit has essentially excused software
inventions from compliance with the enablement and best mode requirements.").
92. See Martin Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, A Technical Critique of Fifty
Software Patents, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249 (2005) (analyzing the fifty most cited
software patents and concluding that the patents generally represented genuine innovations and
were not too broadly drafted, but that the level of disclosure was deficient, showing a need for
reform).
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intellectual property law and economic development. The book did
not look closely at the written descriptions of individual inventions,
but instead looked at large databases of such data as patent citations
and categories of invention. However, even that basic data is subject
to distorted disclosure today. The patent citation's role as an indicator
of the importance of the invention is undercut where applicants are
unlikely to know of or disclose relevant prior art, and the patent
examiner is likewise unlikely to uncover it. Even the categories of
invention are unreliable, where an applicant is encouraged to claim
her invention as broadly as possible (beyond the category of
commercial activity where her actual invention arose) and where
subject matter such as software and business method can likewise
extend very widely. The rest of the application is likely to be no more
help in telling a future reader the category of the invention, where a
savvy applicant will not specifically describe the background and
development of the invention.
All these problems (discouragement of disclosure in the written
description and prior art and encouragement of overclaiming) are
exacerbated by the expansion of patentable subject matter. 93 Patent
law now reaches into areas such as business methods94 and software.
95
Such patents are different than patents on airplanes or xylophones. A
patent on a particular machine or drug, regardless of how broadly the
claims are worded, is inherently limited to certain spheres of activity.
Someone making lawnmowers will not infringe a patent on a flying
machine, as long as the lawnmower does not fly. Business method
and software patents, by contrast, are often much more abstract, with
potential applications across the range of human activities. The
abstract nature of new patent subject matter raises many problems for
patent policy. It likewise adds to the problems of inaccuracy from
limited descriptions and overbroad claims. Where the written
description is as sparse as possible, there is little to give concrete
meaning to the abstract invention claimed.96 Where there is no penalty
to claiming broadly, an actual abstract invention may well be claimed
93. But see John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent
Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
729, 735 (2006) (study of early years of business method patents, concluding that they were not
significantly lower quality than patents in other areas).
94. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
95. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
96. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
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in even more abstract terms. Such a patent is likely to be somewhat
mystifying to someone who later tries to figure out just what the
invention was, and where it fit in with what others have done.97
Other rules in patent law, of course, do tend to favor disclosure.
An application must at least meet the minimum requirements of a
written description and include claims.98 Sometimes a fuller written
description will help in enforcing the patent. A court might find that a
claim that on its face appears invalid (because it is indefinite,
ambiguous, or overbroad), can be interpreted as valid in light of the
written description. Sometimes a patentee's argument for
interpretation of a claim turn will succeed because it best fits with the
written description. A definition in the written description will
likewise sometimes help the patentee. However, these rules are
unlikely to outweigh the more specific hazards of providing
unnecessary disclosure that may hurt the patentee in litigation. A
patentee need not choose between the benefits of limited disclosure
(such as reducing the risk of narrow construction) and fuller
disclosure (reducing the risk of claims being held indefinite or
overbroad). The patentee can get both sets of benefits, because she
controls the drafting of the claims. She can seek to draft clearer
claims (to reduce risks of indefiniteness, ambiguity, etc.) and she can
submit multiple, increasingly broader claims, to hedge the risk of
overbreadth.
So today's patents are a much poorer record of technological
history than they could be, compared to a patent law that encourages
inventors to fully disclose just what they had invented and where it fit
in to the landscape of technology. However, the purpose of patent law
is not to preserve history; the purpose is to promote innovation by
providing incentives to inventors. The patent records are a rich trove
for future researchers, but that is simply a nice by-product of the
patent system, not its goal. One would not advocate substantial
reforms in patent law simply to improve the quality of primary
sources for future historians. Changing the incentives would help
future historians, but changes in patent law would change its more
immediate effects.
97. Id. There may be an adverse interplay between these problems. Courts confronted
with broad patents with little disclosure may strain to construe the claims narrowly, and support
such narrow readings by pointing to selected portions of the patent, which in turn suggests to
future drafters to disclose even less. (Cf id. suggesting that Federal Circuit has dealt with
dubious patents with ad hoc claim construction).
98. 35 U.S.C. 112 (2000).
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Many of the best proposals for patent reform, however, do
indeed favor more accurate disclosure by inventors. There is
widespread agreement that the patent system itself needs a measure of
reinvention. Various studies have found that somewhere between one-
half and one-third of patents that are litigated are held invalid. 99 This
suggests that the Patent Office is issuing many patents that should
have been rejected. The most likely reason is the problem of prior art.
A patent examiner lacks the time and resources to accurately
determine whether a claimed invention is really new because that
would require knowing about everything relevant that had ever been
published or put into public use. Rather, the examiner relies largely
on the prior art disclosed by the applicant and the examiner's own
search, which in turn relies heavily on previous patents. Another great
problem with patents is the uncertainty of claim interpretation. No
one really knows how broad a patent is until the courts have
interpreted its claims (if they ever do). Reforms directed toward such
problems often rely on improving the quality of disclosure to the
Patent Office.
Commentators have suggested many means to improve patent
quality. Some focus on the applicant. Applicants could be required to
do a prior art search themselves, as opposed to simply disclosing prior
art of which they know. 0 0 Applicants could be given the option of
paying a higher application fee (enabling the Patent Office to perform
a more thorough search) in exchange for a stronger presumption of
patent validity.10 ' Other proposals seek to get other parties to add
prior art to the patent record. A post-grant opposition process would
permit other parties (such as competitors, standards organizations, or
public interest groups) an opportunity to present evidence of
invalidating prior art before a patent is issued.
10 2
99. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-06 (1998).
100. See Schneck, supra note 84, at 698-99. See also Vincent Chiappetta, Defining The
Proper Scope Of Internet Patents: If We Don't Know Where We Want To Go, We're Unlikely To
Get There, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 289, 334 (2000) (suggesting a search
requirement for patents in new subject matter areas); Kevin Mack, Reforming Inequitable
Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147,
167-68 (2006).
101. Mark A. Lemley, Douglas Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to do About Bad
Patents, 28 CATO REV. OF Bus. & GOV'T. REG., Winter 2005-2006, at 10-13.
102. Numerous commentators have supported a post-grant opposition procedure. See, e.g.,
ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT
180 (2004); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 577, 613-14
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Other reform measures seek to develop other sources of
information. As opposed to changing the legal rules governing
disclosure by the applicant, some seek to open up the lines of
disclosure to other parties. A number of initiatives seek to improve
the prior art available to the Patent Office. The Patent Office will
attempt a pilot project to implement Community Patent Review, using
Wikipedia-like technology, where interested parties are invited to
submit material relevant to pending applications. 0 3 The Electronic
Frontier Foundation's Patent Busting Project solicits knowledgeable
parties to identify improperly issued patents that threaten to stifle
innovation, and to submit materials tending to show that claimed
inventions were not new.' 0 4 Monetary rewards could be given to those
who bring forward evidence that invalidates a patent. 0 5 All of those
measures would have the secondary effect of increasing the likely
value of patent records as a research source.
IV. CONCLUSION
The main purpose of the patent system is not to develop a
storehouse of technological history. Better disclosure, however, is
closely linked to the functioning of the patent system. The present
rules encourage limited and vague description of the invention,
blissful ignorance of work by others (and therefore no disclosure of
it), and overbroad claiming of the invention. Better disclosure would
help the Patent Office in determining whether a patent should issue,
give better notice of the inventor's claimed invention to the others
interested in the technology, and help courts in claim construction.
Adapting the various rules affecting disclosure involves a delicate
balance of patent policies. The long term view encouraged by
thinking about patents as primary historical sources could be helpful.
Much of the present activity in patent reform is driven by specific
(1999); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "'Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and How
Should We Change?- The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L. J. 61, 95, 123
(2006); Pamela Samuelson, Why Reform the U.S. Patent System? Considering Three Important
Reforms to Improve the Current System, 47 COMM. OF THE ACM, June 2004, at 19, 21-22.
103. See Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open Review,
and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 151-52 (2006).
104. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Patent Busting Project, An EFF Initiative to
Protect Innovation and Free Expression,
http://w2.eff.org/patent/EFFPatentBustingProject.pdf.
105. See John R. Thomas, Collusion And Collective Action In The Patent System: A
Proposal For Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 342 (2001) ("Members of the public
who timely submit prior art that contributes to the rejection of a patent application would be
eligible for the bounty.").
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industries, which have quite different axes to grind. Computer and
pharmaceutical companies have lined up on opposite sides on many
issues, both in Congress and in the courts. Thinking about patents for
the long term emphasizes the basic value of accuracy in the annals of
invention.
